In the last two decades more than 120 countries have adopted a multiyear budget process (Medium-Term Framework, or MTF) that enables the central government to set multiyear …scal targets. This paper analyzes a newly-collected dataset of worldwide MTF adoptions during 1990-2008. It exploits within-country variation in adoption in a dynamic panel framework to estimate MTFs'impacts on aggregate as well as sectoral measures of …scal performance. We …nd that on average multiyear budgeting improves budget balance by about 2 percentage points with more advanced MTF phases having a larger impact. Higher-phase MTFs also reduce health spending volatility, while only the top-phase MTF has a measurable impact on health sector technical e¢ ciency.
Introduction
It is generally accepted that …scal performance is a key factor in a country's long-run growth. The key public …nance problem that multiyear budgets are designed to overcome is dynamic …scal ine¢ ciency. This can manifest itself as strategic obstruction of future political opponents (Alesina and Tabellini 1990) , electoral manipulation through budget cycles (Drazen 2000, Brender and Drazen 2005) , dynamic common pool (Velasco 1999) , or timeinconsistent voters (Bisin, Lizerri, and Yariv 2011) . Through dynamic distortions government spending and borrowing deviate from the social planner level, resulting in suboptimally high de…cits and debt.
2 Dynamic ine¢ ciency seems particularly inherent in a yearly cycle of budget planning and implementation. Wildavsky (1986, p. 317 ) makes this point as follows:
"Multiyear budgeting has long been proposed as a reform to enhance rational choice by viewing resource allocation in a long-term perspective. One year, it has been argued, leads to short-sightedness, because only the next year's expenditures are reviewed;
overspending, because huge disbursements in future years are hidden; conservatism, because incremental changes do not open up large future vistas; and parochialism, because programs tend to be viewed in isolation rather than in comparison with their future costs in relation to expected revenue."
At the basis of an MTF is a commitment by the budget actors to a medium-term, typically two to four years, …scal trajectory. 3 Thus, it can be seen either as an ex ante constraint on the government, similar to a balanced budget requirement (Alesina and Perotti 1996) , or as a "contract approach" to centralizing the budget process through a broad-based political agreement (von Hagen and Harden 1995) . 4 While the theoretical underpinnings of multiyear budgeting are well understood, the empirical evidence on its impact is scarce. The main obstacle has been the shortage of data on MTF adoption. An additional impediment has been the elusiveness of plausible sources of exogenous variation in country-level institutions in general (Acemoglu 2005) and budget institutions in particular.
5
When an MTF is implemented well we should observe (i) spending that is limited by resource availability (aggregate …scal discipline), (ii) predictable budget allocations across sectors (sectoral stability), and (iii) cost e¤ective public goods delivery (technical e¢ ciency).
We classify MTFs into three phases: Medium-Term Fiscal Framework (MTFF, which establishes the aggregate resource envelope), Medium-Term Budgetary Framework (MTBF, which focuses on the allocation of spending across sectors, programs, and agencies), and MediumTerm Performance Framework (MTPF, which sets within-sector performance targets). The three MTF phases are "nested": an MTPF contains an MTBF, which in turn contains an MTFF. 6 This paper is the …rst large-sample empirical study of the MTFs'impacts on …scal per-
formance. We collect and analyze adoption data for a panel of 181 countries over the period [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] , the most comprehensive dataset on worldwide MTF adoption to date. We provide a system for classifying MTFs into three phases, based on their level of sectoral disaggregation, and estimate the e¤ects of each phase on aggregate as well as sectoral measures of …scal performance.
The rich time variation in the data allows us to model the dynamics of the …scal adjustment process as well as address potential endogeneity of MTF to …scal performance. We use a Di¤erence Generalized Method of Moments (D-GMM) approach to estimate dynamic panel data models of …scal performance. These models are designed for "small T large N " panels and, when correctly applied, generate valid internal instruments that hold the promise of overcoming identi…cation issues in the absence of valid and/or strong external instruments, a typical hurdle with country-level data.
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Our empirical results show that multiyear budgeting improves …scal discipline by about 2 percentage points of budget balance (surplus/de…cit) to GDP, on average. The e¤ect is larger for the more advanced phases. We also …nd that an MTBF and an MTPF improve sectoral stability, by reducing the volatility in per capita health spending (in purchasing power parity dollars, PPP$), and that an MTPF also contributes to health sector technical e¢ ciency, measured as technical e¢ ciency scores from a stochastic frontier model of public health delivery. We probe the credibility of these estimates by carrying out a detailed analysis of instrument strength and instrument validity and by exploring sensitivity to alternative speci…cations. We keep the empirical model simple and transparent by restricting the number of moment conditions through a parsimonious lag structure and collapsed instruments.
Our results are more supportive of MTF e¤ectiveness than the conclusions of prior work. Bevan and Palomba (2001) , La Houerou and Taliercio (2002) , Holmes and Evans (2003) ,
and Oyugi (2008) , based on case studies of about a dozen African countries, conclude that the budget process has generally not improved after the adoption of an MTF, while Boex, Martinez-Vasquez, and McNab (2000) and Oxford Policy Management (2000) raise questions of adequate implementation. Wescott (2008) and Filc and Scartascini (2010) , using data from Central and Latin America, found mixed results and emphasized the importance of piloting
MTFs in areas where they are likely to deliver the largest payo¤s. However, Gleich (2003) and Ylaoutinen (2004) …nd that MTFs in Central and Eastern Europe alleviated the de…cits and debts that emerged in the second half of the 1990s. Alesina, Hausmann, Hommes, and Stein (1999) and Fabrizio and Mody (2006) include MTFs in broader indexes of budget institutions using data from Latin America and Eastern Europe, respectively, and …nd positive e¤ects of the resulting "…scal institutions index" on the primary-balance-to-GDP ratio. 7 The D-GMM approach was …rst proposed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988) and later developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) . Recent re…nements include Windmeijer (2005) and Roodman (2009) . 8 Drawing on extensive operational experience, Schiavo-Campo (2009) puts forward conceptual arguments for a gradual introduction of these institutions and emphasizes the potential downsides of instant reform. 9 In these two papers the MTF component of the index is weighted by 1/10 and 1/12, respectively.
Our results complement this empirical literature by providing evidence of MTF impacts from a global sample. While previous studies rely on small regional samples and either crosssectional or static panel models our empirical methodology takes advantage of the sample coverage and the time variation in MTF presence to estimate dynamic panel models. We also propose a new classi…cation of MTF phases, based on the level of disaggregation of the central government's …scal objectives.
Our paper is also related to the broader empirical literature on budget institutions, e.g., balanced budget amendments, debt ceilings, tax and expenditure limitations. Examples include: Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995), von Hagen and Eichengreen (1996) , Stein, Talvi, and Grisanti (1999) , Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999) , Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) , Mihov (2003), von Hagen and Wol¤ (2006) , and Hallerberg and Ylaoutinen (2010), all using country-level data; and Poterba (1994) , Bohn and Inman (1996) , Kiewert and Szakaly (1996) , Poterba and Rueben (1999) , Knight (2000) , Knight and Levinson (2000) , and Fatas and Mihov (2006) using state-level data.
10
We contribute to this literature by, …rst, providing new data and measurement on an important budget institution; second, by proposing a dynamic panel approach (di¤erence GMM) that models the …scal adjustment process while making progress in addressing di¢ cult identi…cation issues such as institutional endogeneity; and third, by studying in addition to aggregate e¤ects, which have been the focus of this literature, sectoral e¤ects as well, namely …scal performance in the key health sector.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a background discussion of the MTFs, their adoption trends, and their expected e¤ects on …scal performance. Section 3 discusses the data and the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the empirical results.
Section 5 summarizes the paper and suggests directions for future research.
Background
This section takes a …rst look at the worldwide MTF adoption data collected for this paper by presenting stylized facts on MTF global and regional growth during 1990-2008. It also discusses the rationale behind MTFs as budget institutions designed to improve …scal performance. This discussion helps generate theoretical expectations. We subject these hypotheses to empirical scrutiny in the next section.
MTF Phases. We classify MTFs into three phases, based on the following criteria. The three phases are "nested" in the sense that a more advanced phase contains the lower phase just below it.
Stylized Facts. Although some forms of medium-term …scal projections existed in OECD countries as early as the 1960s, the …rst application of a coherent system of multiyear budgeting occurred in Australia, where an MTF was introduced in the 1980s (see Folscher 2007) .
MTFs have since been adopted by a large number of low and middle-income countries as a central element of public …nancial management reform. Table 2 shows that the shift to MTBFs and MTPFs has been mainly, and in the case of MTPF, exclusively, through transitions from a lower phase to an advanced one. In this sense the nesting concept underlying our dataset is re ‡ected in observed adoption patterns.
13 11 We use these de…nitions to code each country-year in our sample as falling into each of these mutually exclusive categories; see Section 3 and the Online Appendix for a description of variable construction, and World Bank (2012) for further details. 12 We coded countries that introduced a "pilot" MTBF in a few sectors as MTFF since we cannot systematically determine if the health sector, our focus in the analysis below, is one of the piloted sectors. 13 Three countries (Bulgaria, Canada, and Norway) performed a full transition -from an MTFF to an MTBF to an MTPF -during our sample period.
Advanced economies had achieved almost complete coverage (96%) by the end of our sample period. MTF adoption in advanced countries occurred in two waves. In the late 1980s and early 1990s only a few advanced economies followed Australia's lead in MTF adoption. Then, in the late 1990s MTFs were introduced in the European Union to support budgetary targets set as pre-conditions for monetary union. By the end of 2008, 46% of the MTFs in advanced economies were MTPFs. The relatively low fraction of the second-phase MTBFs in these countries suggests that when advanced economies decide to move beyond an MTFF introducing a performance focus is a natural development, re ‡ecting their more sophisticated budgeting systems.
While MTFs had begun to spread across industrial countries and Africa in the early 1990s, it was not until the late 1990s and 2000s that they took o¤ in emerging market economies. The end result has been that adoption patterns have been relatively uniform across income and development levels. Apart from the widespread adoption of MTFs in high-income countries, there is little di¤erence in penetration across upper middle, lower middle, and lower-income countries. MTF adoption does not appear to follow a monotonic relationship with respect to income per capita or the human development index. 14 MTF Objectives. MTFs represent a multiyear approach to budgeting that addresses the shortcomings of annual budgeting noted above in the Introduction. Most public programs require funding and yield bene…ts over a number of years, but annual budgeting largely ignores future costs and bene…ts. Annual budgets take as their starting point the previous year's budget and modify it in an incremental manner, making it di¢ cult to re-prioritize policies and spending. 15 MTFs take a strategic forward-looking approach to establishing spending priorities and resource allocation. They also look across sectors, programs, and projects to see how spending can be restructured to best serve national objectives, which contrasts with the narrow self-interest of spending agencies and bene…ciaries that dominates resource allocation under annual budgeting (World Bank 1998).
Insofar as multiyear budgeting constrains spending to resource availability, makes budget allocations re ‡ect spending priorities, and generates cost e¤ectiveness in the delivery of public goods and services, it should contribute directly to …scal discipline, sectoral stability, and technical e¢ ciency.
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14 Figures A1 and A2 in the Online Appendix illustrate this point. 15 While incremental budgeting can work well in times of revenue growth, it comes under particular pressure when revenue falls, becomes more volatile, or reaches its natural limit. In these instances expenditure prioritization takes on increased importance. 16 There is also a link to broader economic development. With improved …scal outcomes, growth should be MTFFs can promote …scal discipline by addressing the root causes of de…cit bias. By specifying an overall "top-down" resource constraint, an MTFF reins in the political tendency to over-commit resources (the common pool problem). By imparting a medium-term perspective to budgeting and taking into account the future …scal costs of government policies and programs, an MTFF can …ll information gaps that allow politicians to renege on commitments to implement a¤ordable policies (the time consistency problem). A medium-term perspective also encourages governments to conduct discretionary stabilization in a symmetric, counter-cyclical manner, rather than asymmetrically which leads to rising de…cits and debt (Kumar and Ter-Minassian 2007) .
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Since MTBFs and MTPFs incorporate an MTFF, they should have a stronger e¤ect on …scal discipline compared to an MTFF alone. This is in part because countries that have the administrative capacity to implement these higher phases will likely also have greater …scal discipline. But it is also a consequence of better prioritization and more emphasis on performance, which can bring the payo¤ to …scal discipline into sharper focus.
Prioritization guided by longer-term sector strategies should improve sectoral stability.
Insofar as spending agencies prepare sector strategies, identify their resource needs, and allocate their budgets according to strategic priorities, this "bottom-up" prioritization should increase the predictability of spending with higher economic and social returns. IMF (2007) argues that expenditure decisions not anchored in a medium-term framework could generate "mismatches between available resources and planned spending and could translate into expenditure volatility with adverse consequences for economic and social outcomes." (p.
22). In the health sector in particular spending volatility can lead to stock-outs, higher per item costs, as suppliers start charging premiums to protect against payment and production uncertainties, and additional emergency costs.
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The outcome of e¤ective prioritization should be a change in the allocation of spending. In the short term, spending volatility by sector may increase as spending is reallocated to more productive sectors and programs. Thereafter, insofar as spending decisions are guided by strategic priorities with a longer-term focus, sectoral spending should become less volatile, especially in the high-priority areas of health and education. The payo¤ coming from an higher, in ‡ation lower, and macroeconomic volatility reduced. Moreover, as the quality of spending improves, higher incomes should be accompanied by lower poverty rates, while better infrastructure should contribute to even higher growth and further poverty reduction. 17 On the downside, if spending agencies view multiyear …scal targets as minimum entitlements, rather than constraints, ceilings, or forward estimates, MTFFs could actually be a source of …scal indiscipline and de…cit bias (Schick 2010) .
18 See Lane and Glassman (2008) on how unpredictable health spending negatively a¤ects health outcomes.
MTBF should be even higher with an MTPF since this last phase goes further by setting within-sector and within-program performance targets.
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A third dimension of …scal performance is technical e¢ ciency at the sector level. The better the economic and social outcomes achieved by spending programs from a given amount of budget resources, or the fewer resources used to achieve given outcomes, the more technically e¢ cient is government spending. Improved technical e¢ ciency may follow from an MTFF, but is more likely a consequence of an MTBF and MTPF, with the latter possibly having the largest e¤ect as budgets now include within-sector performance targets. Of all government functions, the outcomes of government-provided health care are probably easier to compare across nations, which has spawned a signi…cant literature in estimating technical e¢ ciency scores in the health sector cross-nationally (see, e.g., Greene 2004) .
Based on these considerations we state the expected MTF e¤ects on …scal performance in the following hypotheses:
(H1) Multiyear budgeting improves …scal discipline, with higher-phase MTFs having larger e¤ects.
(H2) MTBF and MTPF improve sectoral stability, with an MTPF having a larger e¤ect.
(H3) MTPF improves sectoral technical e¢ ciency.
The rest of the paper examines the evidence for these conjectures.
Data and Empirical Strategy
This section discusses our choice of variables and takes a …rst look at the statistical properties of our data. It then presents our empirical strategy for identifying and estimating the e¤ects of multiyear budgeting on …scal performance. It is important to note that MTF reform is very rarely an abrupt switch and more commonly a prolonged and gradual process: "big bang adoption of MTF [...] in not the norm." (World Bank 2012, p. 88) . Countries that used the gradual approach to reform have often prefaced full implementation by piloting the MTF in a limited number of sectors, e.g., education, health, infrastructure. We have chosen to code the year of adoption as the year when the MTF is fully functional. That means a country may have MTF components in place even before it appears as an adopter in our data. Figure 2 provides a visual illustration.
The …gure plots the average budget balance before/after the year of MTF adoption. The series suggest that MTF adoption follows after several years of persistent de…cits in the neighborhood of 3% of GDP. In the two years before full implementation the average de…cit starts to shrink; after adoption the average balance improves further and the de…cit hovers around 1.5% of GDP.
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We measure …scal discipline, an indicator of aggregate …scal performance, by the ratio of total budget balance (surplus/de…cit) to GDP. The literature suggests alternative indicators, e.g., primary balance and the debt-to-GDP ratio. We preferred the total budget balance because we observe it for 23 more countries than the primary balance (and 33 more countries than debt-to-GDP) a¤ording us 18-22% more panel observations. We also believe that by including government borrowing costs the total budget balance is a more complete indicator of the general state of public …nances. For ease of comparison with prior work we also present results with the primary balance; see Table 10. 22 20 For the purposes of this paper, we refrain from making judgments to distinguish between an MTF present in the law (de jure) and a well-functioning MTF (de facto). Such a distinction would introduce subjectivity into the analysis. A signi…cant fraction of poorly-implemented MTFs would attenuate our empirical estimates. 21 Other interpretations are that smaller-scale reforms, e.g., limits on de…cit or debt, are attempted before moving on to the more comprehensive multiyear approach, or, that prior to adoption the executive, which typically opposes the constraints implicit in an MTF, may try to di¤use legislative momentum for reform with temporary cost-cutting de…cit-reducing measures. 22 In our sample the correlation between total budget balance and primary balance is 0:90. It could be argued that the total balance does not account for the e¤ect of in ‡ation on interest payments and that interest payments are a function of accumulated debt and not a good re ‡ection of the government's current …scal stance. Thus the MTF e¤ects on the total balance should be comparatively smaller. Our estimates in Tables 9 and 10 are consistent with this logic.
Sectoral stability does not have a universally accepted de…nition. However, a plausible indicator seems to be the volatility of sectoral spending, e.g., health or education. Since volatility in these sectors jeopardizes long-term economic and social objectives, health care and public education spending should be largely una¤ected by short-term ‡uctuations in GDP. Given data constraints and the requirement that the public good category should be plausibly comparable across countries, we choose to work with the volatility of per-capita health spending, measured in PPP$. We de…ne volatility of a time series y i;t for country i as the absolute yearly growth rate of the detrended series: V olatility i;t = jlog (ỹ i;t =ỹ i;t 1 )j 100; whereỹ i;t is the linearly detrended series for y i;t :
Technical e¢ ciency in the health sector is typically measured using technical e¢ ciency scores from a Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). This is the approach we adopt. The SFA approach relies on a reduced-form relationship between inputs and outputs. The countries with the highest health output after controlling for health inputs are the most e¢ cient and delineate the frontier. The e¢ ciency level of the other countries is measured relative to this benchmark. 23 We compute technical e¢ ciency scores in the health sector using a parsimonious version of the model estimated in Greene (2004) . The outcome of interest is life expectancy at birth, and the input is health spending per capita. The covariates are population density and OECD membership. The model is: log(Lif e_Exp i;t ) = 0 + 1 log(Health_Spend i;t ) +
(1) + 2 Density i;t + 3 OECD i;t + t + v i;t u i;t where t 's are year …xed e¤ects, v i;t N (0; v ), and u i;t = jU i;t j Exp(0; u ):
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The parameters are then estimated by maximum likelihood. The estimates of v i;t u i;t are translated into an estimate of u i;t using the standard Jondrow, Materov, Lovell, and Schmidt (1982) formula. Technical e¢ ciency can be shown to be:
23 The SFA was inspired by Farrell (1957) , who de…ned technical e¢ ciency as the ability to produce the maximum possible output from a given set of inputs, and measured it as the di¤erence between maximum attainable output and realized output. Ine¢ ciencies might arise from waste or because the most cost-e¤ective set of programs is not implemented.
24 Greene (2004) also includes education spending per capita as an input, and controls in the ine¢ ciency distribution for time invariant measures of government voice and accountability, government e¤ectiveness, share of government …nancing, the Gini coe¢ cient, and GDP per capita. whereû i;t is the maximum likelihood estimate of u i;t : Table 3 presents estimates of the production function in (1). The coe¢ cients follow the same pattern noticed in prior work using di¤erent data. The asymmetry parameter = u = v is also within the range of variation reported previously. Our estimated mean e¢ ciency is 86.48.
Figures 3 and 4 give a graphical intuition for the e¢ ciency scores by plotting country averages against control of corruption and a measure of development, together with a quadratic …t curve. As expected, technical e¢ ciency increases in both of these measures of e¤ective governance. In Figure 5 we plot the time series of technical e¢ ciency for four countries that had an MTPF reform during our sample period. The newly democratic countries on the right (both of whom adopted democratic constitutions in the early 1990s) experience more volatility in their e¢ ciency scores, likely due to their ongoing institutional reforms.
25 Table 1 reports summary statistics for our main variables. All variables display considerable variation both between and within countries, justifying the use of panel estimation
techniques. An exception is MTPF, which has small within variation due to the few adoptions of this top phase. Table A1 Empirical Model. Governments use the national budget as a tool for achieving economic objectives. In a steady-state equilibrium the trajectory of the government's budget balance thus re ‡ects the bene…ts and costs of …nancing the goverment's economic policy, given the budget institutions in place and the characteristics of the economy. Let Y i;t denote the government's target level of a …scal variable like budget balance. It can be modeled as:
where x i;t are …scal institutions, w i;t are covariates for country i at time t that may include an intercept, and " i;t is a mean zero error term that captures unobserved heterogeneity.
In practice, observed …scal performance in a given year y i;t may deviate from its target level Y i;t due to adjustment costs, e.g., legislative delays in passing executive initiatives, unpredictability of budgeted revenues, unforseen expenditures due to cost overruns or in ‡ation.
To capture these factors we can specify a target adjustment model:
where 2 [0; 1] is the adjustment cost. This means for example that if = 0 then y i;t = Y i;t namely the adjustment toward the target takes place immediately. Combining equations (3) and (4) we can write a model for the observables:
where ( ; ;u i;t ) = (1 ) (b; d; " i;t ) : Incomplete adjustment ( 6 = 0) thus leads to a form of state dependence where last period's y i;t 1 determines this period's y i;t :
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A more general version of model (5) would include further lags of y i;t as well as year e¤ects t and time-invariant unobserved country-speci…c heterogeneity c i , which likely plays an important role, leading to the following dynamic speci…cation:
with s = 1; 2; :::; L and x 0 i;t = M T F i;t or x 0 i;t = (M T F F i;t ; M T BF i;t ; M T P F i;t ) and the idiosyncratic error u i;t is assumed to be mean zero. Besides providing a more realistic model of …scal adjustment, this dynamic panel model also partly controls for possible reverse causality.
For example, if past budget performance y i;t 1 a¤ects current …scal institutions x i;t then this feedback e¤ect is accounted for in model (6).
Identi…cation. Consistently estimating the impact of a budget institution on …scal performance requires that we address two key identi…cation challenges: reverse causality and omitted variable bias. First, reverse causality arises because …scal stress may have prompted a country to restrain spending, adopt an MTF, or strengthen an existing one. Von Hagen (2006, p. 474) notes that "Historical experience suggests that governments make e¤orts to centralize the budget process to overcome sharp …scal crises." If MTFs have positive e¤ects on …scal performance, and poor …scal performance increases the probability of adopting an MTF, then the reverse causality bias is likely negative. 27 26 Alternatively, correlation between y i;t and y i;t 1 could be induced by unobserved heterogeneity. 27 The endogeneity of budget institutions with respect to …scal performance is extensively discussed in Second, omitted variable bias arises due to failure to account for a factor that a¤ects both the adoption of an MTF and …scal performance. For instance, strong macro performance may reduce the pressure on a government to reform budget institutions, and, at the same time, improve the government's …scal outcomes, thus leading to negative omitted variable bias. As suggested by Fabrizio and Mody (2006) a partial solution to this problem is to use within-country variation in …scal institutions. This approach in e¤ect controls for time invariant country-level heterogeneity that may in ‡uence budget de…cits. The problem of omitted variables is thus alleviated; however it is not eliminated.
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The dynamic panel formulation in (6) while partly addressing reverse causality, may however introduce an additional source of endogeneity. To see this notice that without controlling for the …xed e¤ects (i.e., assuming c i = 0 for all i) the dynamic model has a built-in positive bias in the coe¢ cient on the …rst lag of the dependent variable 1 , since y i;t s are correlated with c i . Explicitly controlling for the …xed e¤ects using an within FE estimator eliminates this dynamic bias but 1 now contains a negative bias due to the fact that the within-group transform y i;t 1 = y i;t 1
where L is the number of observations lost by including L lags of the dependent variable. Thus an unbiased estimate of the lagged dependent variable coe¢ cient^ 1 should lie in the range between the FE estimate and the OLS estimate. This "bracketing range" then provides a natural speci…cation check (Bond 2002 ) and we use it in our own results below to assess the validity of our chosen speci…cations. 29 An alternative approach to controlling for the …xed e¤ects is to …rst-di¤erence the model in (6) to eliminate the …xed e¤ects c i :
where y i;t = y i;t y i;t 1 : Because our panel is unbalanced, in the baseline speci…cations we the country-level literature (see Alesina and Perotti 1999 , Stein, Talvi, and Grisanti 1999 , Perotti and Kontopoulos 2002 , and Fabrizio and Mody 2006 . None of these papers, however, proposes an instrument that in ‡uences the probability of …scal reform while being exogenous to …scal performance. 28 Most studies have not been able to use this method because either budget institutions do not change much over time or because changes are di¢ cult to measure. When it has been implemented with U.S. statelevel data (e.g., Knight and Levinson 2000) the results are typically di¤erent, indicating that the problem of omitted variables is relevant. Additional omitted variables could include political institutions. Evidence from Europe shows that institutional design responds to political factors and events (Hallerberg, Rolf, and von Hagen 2009) .
29 Nickell (1981) shows that the "dynamic panel bias" disappears only when T approaches in…nity. Since in our data T 19; it is necessary to apply methods that correct for this bias.
use instead a related transformation, namely forward orthogonal deviations de…ned as:
where T i;t is the number of available future observations. 30 Orthogonal deviations, instead of subtracting the previous observation from the current observation, subtract the average of all future available observations. This transformation maximizes sample size in panels with gaps (Arellano and Bover 1995) . Note that using either transformation makes y i;t 1 correlated with u i;t in model (7). Thus, the OLS estimator would still be inconsistent for this model. However, under appropriate conditions, a panel GMM estimator for (7) would be consistent.
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Our baseline identi…cation assumptions are that, given t = 2; :::; T :
E(M T F i;t s u i;t ) = 0; for s = 1; 2; :::; t 1
and we treat w i;t as strictly exogenous: E(w 0 i;t s u i;t ) = 0 for all s: 32 The above equations say that the idiosyncratic error is serially uncorrelated and that past values of the MTF are not correlated with the current error. Notice that assumption (10) is weak in the sense that it allows for both contemporaneous correlation between MTF and the error, for instance due to omitted time-varying factors or simultaneity, as well as for feedback e¤ects from u i;t to future MTF. These assumptions generate the following moment conditions (see, e.g., Cameron and
Trivedi 2005):
E(y i;t s u i;t ) = 0; for s = 2; :::; t 1 (11) E(M T F i;t s u i;t ) = 0; for s = 2; :::; t 1
which mean that: (a) one can use second and later lags of y i;t as instruments for y i;t 1 and potentially other lags, and (b) one can use second and later lags of M T F i;t as instruments 30 The subscript t 1 on the right side of (8) re ‡ects the standard practice of dating ortogonal deviations one period late, for consistency with the …rst-di¤erence transform.
31 Hayakawa (2009a) presents Monte Carlo simulations that suggest that the GMM estimator for a dynamic panel data model transformed by orthogonal deviations tends to perform better than for one transformed by …rst di¤erences in terms of biases, standard deviations, and RMSE. 32 We include all covariates w i;t lagged one period to minimize the potential for endogeneity with the dependent variable (Baltagi, Demetriades, and Law 2009). for M T F i;t :
Below we provide auxiliary evidence that these conditions hold in our setting and study the sensitivity of our results to their potential violation. Here we mention two ways to empirically examine (9)-(10). First, a basic test for the no serial correlation condition in (9) can be implemented as a second-order serial correlation test for the di¤erenced residuals (Arellano and Bond 1991) and we report this test with all our speci…cations. To strengthen the case for lack of serial correlation we include year …xed e¤ects t in all speci…cations. 33 Second, to check for potential violations of (10) we have examined the lagged correlation between MTF and several factors that prior literature has linked to …scal discipline: macro, international, political, and institutional; see Table 4 . Based on the two …rst panels of this table we select the statistically signi…cant correlates as covariates for our baseline model. These are: openness, con ‡ict, balanced budget rule, and debt rule.
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Estimation and Inference. We implement the instrumentation strategy described above using the Di¤erence Generalized Method of Moments (D-GMM) approach by constructing GMM-style instruments, i.e., replace missing observations with zeros. We denote them as
i;t 2 and similarly for other lags. The D-GMM estimator is consistent under the identi…cation assumptions (9)-(10); see, e.g., Wooldridge (2002) . The number of moment conditions increases with T and negatively a¤ects the performance of the estimator in …nite samples. Too many moment conditions can also over…t endogenous variables, failing to adequately address the aforementioned endogeneity problems. Thus, it is important to keep the number of instruments in check (Roodman 2009 ). Two ways of achieving this goal are: limiting the number of lags and collapsing the instrument matrix. In our baseline speci…cations we use both: we limit the instrument lag structure to one lag for each endogenous variable and we collapse the instrument matrix, unless otherwise noted.
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Our baseline speci…cation computes two-step D-GMM estimates with standard errors corrected with the Windmeijer (2005) procedure. We use the two-step standard error correction because the original variance formula has been shown to produce two-step standard 33 Notice that y i;t 2 and later lags of the dependent variable are relevant instruments for y i;t unless y i;t is close to a random walk, in which case past levels convey little information about future changes. Table  A2 in the Online Appendix presents unit root test results for our four …scal performance measures. The IPS test statistic safely rejects the null hypothesis of unit root in each case. 34 The case for strict exogeneity of the covariates balanced budget and debt rule is perhaps less strong. However, when we omit them, or treat them as predetermined, instrumenting their transformation with their second lag, the results reported below change little. 35 In large samples collapsing the instruments reduces statistical e¢ ciency, however in small samples it may alleviate the bias created when the number of instruments approaches the number of panel units.
errors that are implausibly small.
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Our empirical strategy generates credible estimates as long as the instruments are su¢ -ciently strong predictors of the endogenous variables. A standard test for instrument strength in dynamic panel GMM regressions does not currently exist, so gauging instrument strength empirically is not trivial. 37 We follow an approach for assessing instrument strength based on Hayakawa (2009b) and Bun and Windmeijer (2010) , and recently applied to the case of multiple endogenous regressors by Bazzi and Clemens (2013) . Speci…cally, we construct the instrument matrix and estimate the di¤erence equation (7) in a 2SLS framework. This allows us to compute an LM statistic for underidenti…cation, which tests the null that the excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the multiple endogenous regressors, as well as an F statistic for the predictive strength of GMM-style instruments in our D-GMM framework.
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An alternative estimation approach is the System Generalized Method of Moments (S-GMM) proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) ; this estimator may increase e¢ ciency by further instrumenting for the endogenous variables in the levels equation with their lagged di¤erences, but requires an additional identifying assumption, namely that the instruments are exogenous to the …xed e¤ects. Here we choose D-GMM over S-GMM for two reasons:
(i) our analysis of internal instrument strength (see Tables 5b and 7) suggests that weak instrument bias, the typical justi…cation for S-GMM, may not be so serious in our context, since MTF once adopted persists, so past levels can predict future changes reasonably well, and (ii) the additional identi…cation assumption required by S-GMM, namely that MTF reform is uncorrelated with time-invariant country characteristics, is untestable and may be di¢ cult to defend, raising instrument validity concerns. However, for comparison purposes, we also present a S-GMM version of our baseline speci…cation (compare columns 1 and 6 in Table 7 ). (2005) for D-GMM regressions on simulated panels that support this assertion. We also computed one-step D-GMM estimates, in which case we use cluster-robust standard errors, i.e., robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary patterns of correlation within countries. Results are very similar and are available form the authors upon request.
37 See Stock and Wright (2000) for why weak-instrument diagnostics for linear IV regressions do not apply to the more general setting of GMM.
38 Bun and Windmeijer (2010) argue that the weak-instrument test statistics derived in cross-section are informative about instrument strength in the panel 2SLS equations of the type we estimate. 39 In addition, recent research has challenged the perceived superiority of S-GMM in contexts with weak internal instruments. Hayakawa (2009b) and Bun and Windmeijer (2010) …nd that S-GMM may not be as robust to weak instrument bias as previously thought.
We present our estimation results in the following order. We start with a benchmark model, namely equation (6) with x 0 i;t = M T F i;t ; i.e., not distinguishing between the three phases of multiyear budgeting. Our main …scal performance measure is …scal discipline, measured by total budget balance as a percent of GDP. We …rst estimate a simple speci…cation in Table 5a and then replicate it in a 2SLS framework to assess the strength of its instruments in Table 5b . In Table 6 we explicitly model the simultaneity between budget balance and MTF. In Tables 7 and 8 we study the robustness of the results to potential violations of our identi…cation assumptions. We then move to examining the extent to which the di¤erent multiyear budgeting phases x 0 i;t = (M T F F i;t ; M T BF i;t ; M T P F i;t ) have di¤erential e¤ects on …scal discipline in Table 9 . Finally, in Table 10 we study alternative measures of …scal performance, namely primary budget balance, health spending volatility, and health technical e¢ ciency. These estimates provide additional insight into which multiyear budgeting phases a¤ect which dimensions of …scal performance.
Benchmark Model. In Table 5a we start with a static model of budget balance and do a side-by-side comparison with its dynamic counterpart. Columns (1) and (2) report OLS and FE estimates of the static model. The OLS coe¢ cient for MTF is 0.945 percentage points and not statistically signi…cant while the FE coe¢ cient is negative, closer to zero, and also not statistically signi…cant. In column (3) we instrument for MTF adoption using M T F GM M i;t 2 and estimate the model by D-GMM. The MTF coe¢ cient is now 2.569 percentage points and statistically di¤erent from zero. In columns (4)-(6) we estimate a dynamic version of the model, consistent with the one derived above in equation (6). As discussed above, the dynamic model partly addresses reverse causality from budget balance to MTF: withincountry, an experience of past de…cits may increase the likelihood of adopting an MTF. Some evidence of this e¤ect can be seen by comparing column (2) to column (5) where the FE coe¢ cient of the dynamic model turns positive, suggesting a negative bias in the static model.
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If MTF positively a¤ects balance and the dynamic model is correct, so past balance up to two lags is positively correlated with current balance, then the static model in column (3) violates the exclusion restriction for the instrument M T F GM M i;t 2 and would likely overestimate the MTF coe¢ cient. Indeed, in column (3) the MTF coe¢ cient is half of a percentage point higher compared to its dynamic counterpart in column (6), namely 2.569 vs. 2.047. 40 Across countries, a reverse causality e¤ect of a similar type might be counteracted by institutional costs for adopting this budgeting system. Table 5b probes the strength of the GMM-style instrument by replicating the D-GMM regressions in a standard 2SLS framework, following Hayakawa (2009b) , Bun and Windmeijer (2010) , and Bazzi and Clemens (2013) . We produce orthogonal deviations transformations of the variables, marked with an asterisk (*), based on equation (8) In Table 6 we explicitly model the potential simultaneity between MTF and budget balance hinted at by the results of Table 5a . Columns (1),(2) report the OLS estimates of a simple simultaneous equations model between Balance i;t and M T F i;t that includes country and year …xed e¤ects. Columns (3),(4) report 2SLS estimates. Columns (5),(6) present the reduced-forms. As instruments we use the prior covariates as well as checks and balances and control for GDP growth in both equations. Diermeier and Vlaicu (2011) show that political environments with strong checks and balances have low levels of legislative success; this should reduce the chances that a …scal reform such as an MTF can pass. While the OLS estimates are close to zero, the 2SLS estimates show the pattern of causality conjectured above. MTF improves budget balance, while a higher budget balance reduces the probability of MTF adoption. 3SLS estimates, not reported, are comparable. The reduced-forms in columns (5),(6) verify that at least one of the variables excluded from one equation has a nonzero population coe¢ cient in the other equation.
Robustness. In Table 7 we report estimates where the two lags of the dependent variable are treated as endogenous. We instrument for them using Balance GM M i;t 2 and Balance GM M i;t 3 . In column (1) the MTF coe¢ cient is 2.007, very close to the 2.047 estimate in the simpler 41 Lagged MTF status is positively correlated with future changes because M T F GM M i;t 2 = 0 is likely followed by a change (a negative M T F i;t ) while M T F GM M i;t 2 = 1 is likely followed by no change (zero M T F i;t ). 42 While the second-stage underidenti…cation LM test is analytically exact, the F statistic should be considered heuristic in a panel setting (see Bun and Winmeijer 2010 , Bun and de Haan 2010 , Bazzi and Clemens 2013 . For this reason we do not compute p-values for this test. Moreover, Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values are limited to three endogenous regressors with at least …ve excluded instruments (see their Table 5a , not raising any speci…cation issues. The diagnostic tests are satisfactory. The absence of …rst-order serial correlation in errors is rejected, while the absence of second-order serial correlation is not. We conclude that D-GMM is an internally consistent estimator for our dynamic panel model and, provided the instruments are valid and strong, can be relied upon to carry out statistical inference for hypothesis (H1).
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The remaining columns in Table 7 report alternative speci…cations that relax or modify our identi…cation assumptions in (10) and (12). One way in which the assumption that past MTF is not correlated with current errors can fail is if governments rather than react to past budget problems are instead forward looking, i.e., put an MTF in place to avoid a future anticipated …scal crisis. For example, if the government adopts MTF in anticipation of a large de…cit one year ahead, then E(M T F i;t 1 u i;t ) 6 = 0 and so M T F GM M i;t 2 is no longer a valid instrument for M T F i;t : However, if forward looking reform occurs no earlier than a year ahead, M T F GM M i;t 3 and longer lags still remain valid instruments. In column (2) we report estimates using M T F GM M i;t 6 which is valid if forward looking behavior is no longer than four years, a typical election cycle length. The MTF coe¢ cient is now 1.983, with p-value 0.108. Estimates based on each intermediate lag between two and six, not reported, are all statistically signi…cant and of magnitude similar to the result in column (1). Another way in which assumption (10) may fail is if MTF a¤ects budget balance with a lag. This possibility should be less likely at lower data frequencies, e.g., three-year averaged data. In column (3) we reestimate the model based on data averaged within three-year non-overlapping windows.
The MTF coe¢ cient is similar to the baseline in column (1) in terms of sign, size, and signi…cance. The lagged dependent variable coe¢ cient is smaller, as would be expected, since the lagged dependent variable now covers a longer time horizon and cyclical ‡uctuations are dampened through averaging.
One can also probe the validity of the MTF instrument by exploring possible violations of the moment condition (12). In Table 4 we study the within-country correlation between the instrument M T F GM M i;t 2 and potential determinants of budget balance excluded from our benchmark model. The coe¢ cients indicate that macro factors and international organiza-tion interventions are associated with the instrumnent, conditional on covariates. 44 In Table   7 , columns (4) and (5) we explicitly include these factors as additional covariates and …nd that the baseline result in column (1) is upheld. 45 In column (6) we also present S-GMM estimates, i.e., MTF in levels is additionally instrumented by its lagged di¤erences. The MTF coe¢ cient magnitude remains close to the D-GMM estimate in column (1). This was expected, since the instrument in the transformed model is su¢ cienty strong (see Table 5b) precluding the need for additional moment conditions.
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A more formal approach to checking instrument validity is the Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions as well as the di¤erence-in-Hansen test for instrument subsets. While these tests are limited in that they hinge on the untestable assumption that at least one instrument is valid, they can be useful in spotting gross violations of validity. We also adopt a strategy from Bazzi and Clemens (2013) of tracking changes in the Hansen test after removing key instruments. If the original instruments were invalid, removing them would raise the p-value of the Hansen test, indicating that the validity of the remaining instruments has improved. The results of this analysis are in Table 8 . In columns (1) and (3) (4) decrease, rather than raise, the statistical support for the removed instruments'validity. Finally in column (5) we run a speci…cation with the minimal number of instruments 4/4 that allow di¤erence-in-Hansen tests for both categories of instruments. In both cases, the di¤erence-in-Hansen tests cannot reject the null that the excluded set of four instruments is valid. We use this …nal speci…cation as the basis for placebo tests, i.e., we bring the adoption date forward or backward a number of years and reestimate the model of column (5) with the altered M T F i;t variable. We graph the resulting placebo MTF coe¢ cients in Figure 6 . The placebo 44 International organizations such as the World Bank, the UK's Department for International Development (DFID), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and to a lesser extent the IMF, may recommend, but cannot impose, these reforms as part of a sound public …nancial management strategy. Yet in countries that rely heavily on foreign aid (poorly indebted countries) these recommendations may carry some weight. See Holmes and Evans (2003), World Bank (2012) . 45 The reported results treat the additional covariates as exogenous, i.e., they are instrumented with themselves. Treating them as predetermined, i.e., instrumenting for their transformation using their second lag, does not materially a¤ect the MTF coe¢ cient estimate. We omit U nemployment i;t 1 since it would cut sample size almost in half. 46 To rule out the possibility that the results are driven by subgroups of countries with extreme characteristics we restricted the sample in two ways. First, we exclude highly autocratic countries, de…ned as those whose Polity IV score in 1990 takes the extreme value -10 ("strongly autocratic" in the language of the score producers). Second, we exclude highly developed countries, de…ned as those that are classi…ed by UNDP in 1990 as having "very high human development" based on the country's Human Development Index (HDI). The two subgroups of countries are listed in Online Appendix Table A3 . The estimates are broadly comparable to the baseline and are available from the authors upon request. coe¢ cients are always smaller than the real coe¢ cient and never statistically signi…cant.
They remain high up to three periods around the coded adoption period, and then ‡uctuate close to zero. This pattern may re ‡ect the fact that in the majority of countries MTF reform implementation tends to be a gradual process, often with an experimentation period, rather than a sudden switch.
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MTF Phases. In Table 9 we further explore the relationship between MTF and …scal discipline by looking at whether more advanced MTF phases have stronger e¤ects on …scal discipline, as the arguments presented in Section 2 would have us expect. To check this, we disaggregate the M T F i;t dummy into three dummies M T F F i;t ; M T BF i;t ; and M T P F i;t , with the base category remaining yearly budgeting. The …rst three columns of Table 9 report OLS, FE, and D-GMM estimates for the static version of the model in equation (6) uncollapsed. The additional instruments can be used to perform overidenti…cation tests and we report these at the bottom of the table.
We notice two features of the estimates. First, the patterns observed in Table 5a reappear here; compare columns (2) vs. (5) less. This is to be expected, since each individual MTF phase is further from an absorbing state than the aggregate M T F i;t dummy.
The last three columns of Table 9 present speci…cations where we instrument for the transformed lags of the dependent variable. We maintain the same instruments as before, namely the collapsed second and third lags of budget balance. Column (7) shows that the instrumentation has minimal e¤ects on the estimates. The lagged dependent variable coe¢ cient of 0:405 is inside the FE-OLS range of [0:391; 0:498] ; supporting the chosen model speci…cation. Column (8) estimates the same model using data averaged within three-year non-overlapping windows. As expected the MTF coe¢ cients increase while maintaining their monotonic pattern. In column (9), for comparison, we also present S-GMM estimates.
Alternative Fiscal Performance Measures. In Table 10 we present additional evidence of the impacts of MTF phases by looking at alternative measures of …scal performance: primary budget balance, health spending volatility, and health technical e¢ ciency. The primary balance is that part of the total balance that excludes interest payments on government debt, and thus re ‡ects the ongoing aggregate state of public …nances. The other two measures are sectoral measures of …scal performance, discussed above in Section 3.
The primary balance regressions are in the …rst four columns of Table 10 . As we noted earlier, the primary balance data is less comprehensive than the total balance data, reducing the size of the panel from 161 to 140. The MTF coe¢ cients estimated by GMM are larger than OLS and FE and display the same monotonic pattern as in the total balance regressions: more advanced phases have larger coe¢ cients. The magnitudes are larger than for total balance: (1:66; 2:05; 4:30) now become (2:91; 3:08; 5:99). This seems plausible since the primary balance contains relatively more discretionary spending, and so should be more responsive to budget institutions. The underidenti…cation and weak identi…cation tests based on analogous 2SLS versions show a reduction in the overall strength of the instruments.
Other diagnostic tests appear satisfactory.
The next four columns focus on health spending volatility. The panel length shortens due to the lack of health spending data in the …rst half of the 1990s, as well as the loss of one year to compute the volatility measure. Based on hypothesis (H2) above, we expect the two advanced MTF phases (MTBF and MTPF) to reduce spending volatility, with the top-phase MTPF reducing it more. The pattern of the MTF coe¢ cients in columns (7) and (8) seems consistent with this hypothesis. However, the underidenti…cation test in the analogous 2SLS model fails to reject that the instruments are uncorrelated with the endogenous regressors. This is partly a consequence of a signi…cantly shorter panel but nevertheless raises small sample bias issues.
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The last four columns present estimates of MTF e¤ects on technical e¢ ciency, measured as e¢ ciency scores from a stochastic frontier model of health delivery; see equations (1), (2), and Table 3 . According to hypothesis (H3) only the most advanced MTF phase, namely MTPF, should materially a¤ect technical e¢ ciency because it is the only one that sets within-sector performance targets. As expected this indicator of …scal performance is much more persistent than the previous ones. The FE-OLS bracketing range, based on columns (9) and (10), shifts up to [0:84; 0:99], indicating strong persistence. National health delivery is a complex system that may take decades to fully internalize the bene…ts of a given reform. 49 While the instrument diagnostics in this smaller sample suggest that they are weak predictors of the endogenous variables, the D-GMM point estimates do show the hypothesized pattern. The MTPF coe¢ cient is sizable at about one percentage point, while the lower MTF phases have coe¢ cients very close to zero. If, as is usually the case in the presence of weak instruments, D-GMM is downward biased (Bun and Windmeijer 2010 ) then these coe¢ cients may still serve as a lower bound on the actual e¤ect.
Conclusion
In the last two decades more than 120 countries have moved toward a multiyear budget process. Although there has been much debate in the literature as to whether MTFs are a worthwhile budget institution, a systematic empirical analysis of their impacts has been lacking due to insu¢ cient data on MTF adoption around the world. This paper is the …rst to empirically investigate the MTFs'impacts on …scal performance in a large global sample of countries. We collected a panel dataset of 181 countries over the period 1990-2008, the most comprehensive dataset on global MTF adoption to date. In order to disentangle the e¤ects of the MTF and its di¤erent phases (MTFF, MTBF, and MTPF) from other factors and to correct for potential reverse causality we use a dynamic panel data approach.
The econometric …ndings suggest that, unlike in previous small-sample and case-study analyses, MTF adoption is associated with strong improvement in …scal discipline, the e¤ects increasing with each successive MTF phase. The adoption of an MTBF and an MTPF is associated with a decrease in health spending volatility. Finally, the MTPF seems to be the only MTF phase that exerts a measurable e¤ect on technical e¢ ciency in the health sector, although due to insu¢ cient within-country variation in technical e¢ ciency and MTPF over twelve years this e¤ect is less precisely estimated. Overall these results are more supportive of MTF e¤ectiveness than the conclusions of prior work, and suggest that budget institutions that restrain short-term incentives to manipulate the budget can have tangible bene…ts for …scal performance.
Our analysis may be limited by the fact that an MTF could be in place only in law Table 3 for four countries that have adopted an MTPF during the sample period. In each graph the dotted reference line indicates the year of MTPF reform. Table 8 Column (5). Dotted lines are 95% confidence bounds. 1990-2008 1990-2008 1990-2008 1990-2008 1990-2008 1990-2008 Countries  163  163  163  162  162  161  Observations  2,724  2,724  2,561  2,546  2,546  2,384 Notes: The unit of observation is a country-year from the sample summarized in Table 1 . Columns (1),(2),(4),(5) report OLS standard errors clustered at the country level. Columns (3),(6) report GMM twostep estimates and standard errors with the Windmeijer correction. D-GMM estimates based on the orthogonal deviations transform. In columns (3),(6) the instrument for the transformed MTF i,t is the collapsed second lag of MTF i,t . In Column (6) the lagged dependent variables are treated as exogenous. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10%. 1990-2008 1990-2008 1990-2008 1990-2008 1990-2008 1990-2008 Countries  163  163  163  161  161  161  Observations  2,561  2,561  2,561  2,384  2,384  2,384 Notes: The unit of observation is a country-year from the sample summarized in Table 1 . Columns (2),(5) present the 2SLS counterparts of the D-GMM estimates in columns (3),(6) of Table 5a . Columns (1),(4) are the first stages of columns (2), (5), respectively. Columns (3),(6) are the reduced-forms of columns (2), (5) 1990-2008 1990-2008 1990-2008 1990-2008 1990-2008 1990-2008 Countries  154  154  154  154  154  154  Observations  2,553  2,553  2,553  2,553  2,553  2,553 Notes: The unit of observation is a country-year from the sample summarized in Table 1 . All variables are in levels and contemporaneous to each other. Columns (1),(2) present OLS estimates of the two-equations system. Columns (3),(4) present 2SLS estimates of the two-equations system. Variables other than the dependent variables Balance i,t and MTF i,t are treated as exogenous in their respective equations. Columns (5),(6) are the reduced-forms of columns (3),(4), respectively. System standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10%. 1990-2008 1990-2008 W1-W7 1990-2008 1990-2008 1990-2008 Countries  161  161  158  161  161  162  Observations  2,384  2,384  591  2,363 2,384 2,546
Notes: The unit of observation is a country-year from the sample summarized in Table 1 , except in Column (3) where data is averaged within three-year non-overlapping windows. Each numbered column reports the estimates of the indicated change from the baseline specification in Table 5a Column (6). See Section 4 in the main text. All models include Openness i,t-1 , Conflict i,t-1 , BalBudget i,t-1 , and DebtRule i,t-1 as covariates. Column (4) adds Growth i,t-1 , Inflation i,t-1 as covariates. Column (5) 1990-2008 1990-2008 1990-2008 1990-2008 1990-2008 1990-2008 1990-2008 W1-W7 1990-2008 1990-2008 1990-2008 1996-2008 1996-2008 1996-2008 1996-2008 Table 7 notes. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10%.
